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The First Amendment and
Protection of Reputation and
Privacy--New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan and How it Grew
By WuiLw 0. BERTrEsm'N*
I.

INTRODUaTON

Jim Garrison, the District Attorney of New Orleans, Louisiana,
accused eight local criminal court judges of inefficiency, laziness
and other assorted acts of misfeasance and nonfeasance, including
being subject to "racketeering influences." Garrison was prosecuted and convicted for criminal defamation.
In 1952, James Hill and his family were held captive for 19
hours by a group of escaped convicts. Subsequently, Life published
an article stating that a new Broadway play, "Desperate Hours,"
was based on the Hills' experience. Mr. Hill, claiming that the
article caused him much embarrassment, sued the publisher of
the magazine for invasion of his right of privacy since the fictional
family had undergone several experiences in their misadventures
with the convicts, including a verbal sexual insult to the daughter
of the family. None of these had actually occurred during the
Hills' unfortunate experience.
On September 80, 1962, Major General Edwin A. Walker,
United States Army, retired, appeared on the campus of the
University of Mississippi during the course of a violent riot which
had ensued while United States marshals were attempting to enforce a court order calling for the University's integration. The
Associated Press reported in a dispatch, which was re-printed
in newspapers all over the country, that the general had taken
Member Kentucky and Ohio Bars, Lecturer on Law, University of Cincinnati
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command of the rioters and had led a charge against the embattled
marshals. Walker sued the wire service for libel.
In 1963, the Saturday Evening Post published an article enitled "The Story of a College Football Fix." In it, Wally Butts,
the athletic director and former head football coach of the University of Georgia, was accused of deliberately rigging a football
game with the University of Alabama by giving the head coach of
the other team Georgia's plays and signals. Butts sued the publisher of the magazine for libel.
All of the above events, though widely separated in time and
place share a common element. They have provided the occasions
whereby the Supreme Court of the United States has hammered
out a new set of rules governing freedom of the press under the
first amendment. An intense conflict has arisen between freedom
of expression and those areas of the law whose function is the
protection of the personality,' namely, defamation and privacy.
At this writing, the Court's resolution of this conflict, as illustrated
by its decisions in the specific situations just mentioned, is as
follows:
1. Inasmuch as the judges Garrison had allegedly libelled
were public officials, the statute under which he had been convicted was unconstitutional, since it permitted him to be punished
for false statements made without a reasonable belief in their
truth. Rather, the Court held in Garrison v. Louisiana that there
had to be proof of actual malice, i.e., knowledge that the statements were false or made with reckless disregard of their truth.2
2. Mr. Hill was encumbered in his right of privacy action with
the same burden imposed in cases involving public officials,
namely, the onerous burden of proving actual knowledge of
For the purposes of this article, the premise will be accepted that the
significant social interest protected by the law of defamation and privacy is the
psychic integrity, personality, or inherent human dignity of the individual. See
Rosenlatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion); Berney, Libel
and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. RBv. 1,
40-41 (1965); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity; An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REY. 962, 1000-03 (1964); Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 922 (1963); Spiegel,
Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 So.
CAL. L. Rmv. 280, 288 (1957).
2 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The criminal defamation statute was further objectionable in that it permitted punishment for truthful statements and for false statements made with a reasonable belief in their truth, if such satements arose from
ill-will toward their object. Id. at 78-79.
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ments were false or made with reckless desregard of their truth.2
3. Although the Court was divided concerning the retired
general and the athletic director, since they were not "public
officials" but merely "public figures," a plurality held that they
could recover from their detractors only if they could prove that
the alleged libel was "a defamatory falsehood whose substance
makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers."4
The above cases constitute, temporarily at least, the culmination of the expansion of the doctrine of the Supreme Court's landmark 1964 decision, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 in which
the Court determined that "a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide open" 6 required that the first amendment be extended into an area which had formerly been reserved to state
tort law. This was a striking development, and required a new
evaluation of traditional categories to which most lawyers and
scholars dealing with the law of defamation had long been
accustomed.7 For the torts teacher, New York Times had, as one
eminent commentator facetiously put it, "the dizzying consequence
of transmuting a part of his domain-one that he traditionally does
not reach until the last day of the semester-into constitutional
law, the Valhalla of the law school curriculum."8
As the reader can see from the brief outline of the above rules,
this "dizzying consequence" has been intensified by the Court's
development of the New York Times doctrine over the past four
years. It is the purpose of this article to discuss in some detail the
8
Time, Inc.
4

v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S.
130, 155 (1967). The above rule was enunciated in an opinion by a plurality, but
not a majority of the justices, and therefore is not the opinion of the Court. The
exact nature of its authority and weight is discussed in greater detail at notes 90
and 132 infra, and accompanying text.
5376 U.S. 254(1964).
6 Id. at 270.
7 Until New York Times, defamation had been considered a type of expression not protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952). This was accepted even by advocates of the "absolutist"
interpretation of the amendment. See, e.g., Meildejohn, The First Amendment is
an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 258.
8 Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191. 192.
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development of the New York Times doctrine, its logic and policy,
its place in first amendment theory, its shortcomings, and finally
some possibilities for channels of future growth. The first step
is to consider the case itself, the changes it wrought upon prior
law, and the history of its teachings prior to the 1967 cases.
II.

HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK TIMES DOCTRINE

PRIOR TO THE

1967 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

A. The Facts of New York Times
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, a libel suit by the Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, against a
New York newspaper, arose out of a paid advertisement placed
in the newspaper by a civil rights group."0 Some of the individuals
allegedly responsible for inserting the advertisement were also included as defendants. The plaintiff had been responsible for supervising the fire and police departments of Montgomery. Although
the advertisement did not mention him by name, it did state that
the Montgomery police, "armed with shotguns and tear-gas, [had]
ringed the Alabama State College Campus" in retaliation for
peaceful student demonstrations. The Commissioner contended
that the advertisement could be read as an accusation that the
police had used "intimidation and violence" in answer to the
peaceful protests and had caused numerous frivolous charges to
be brought against civil rights leader, Martin Luther King. Because of his relationship with the police Sullivan claimed that the
9376

U.S. 254 (1964).

10 The exact words of the paragraphs the Commissioner charged to be
libelous were:

In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of
Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from the
school, and truclioads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed
the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall
was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.
0

0

0

0

Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's
peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his
home almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his
person. They have arrested him seven times- for 'speeding,' 'loitering'
and similar 'offenses.' And now they have charged him with 'perjury'-a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years....
The entire advertisement appears in the appendix to the opinion, 376 U.S. at 292.
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unlawful acts allegedly committed by the police force were attributed by the advertisement to him."
It was uncontroverted that many of the facts stated in the
advertisement were not accurate descriptions of the events, that
the New York Times had in its news files stories which showed
that the advertisement was inaccurate, 12 and that no effort had
been made by the advertising department to check their accuracy' 8
The jury was instructed that the statements in the advertisement
were libelous per se and could be the basis for a substantial award,
even though the plaintiff had proved no actual damage, provided
only that the jury believed that the statements in the advertisement
had been made "of and concerning" the plaintiff. 4 The verdict
awarded the Commissioner compensatory and punitive damages
totaling $500,000 against the Times and the individual defendants.
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed.
Relying on the first and fourteenth amendments, the Court announced the following principle:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'
-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' 5
B. The Rationale and Significance of New York Times.
To appreciate the full significance of the New York Times
doctrine, it must be considered in light of the law concerning
defamation of public officials that preceded it. The fact that,
prior to New York Times, defamation was considered to be outside the scope of the first amendment 6 did not mean that comment
on public affairs and public officials which could be considered
libelous was totally unprotected. Such comment enjoyed a "quali"1376 U.S. at 258.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 261.
141d. at 26S.
15 Id. at 279-80. Of course, implicit in this statement is the additional
principle that constitutionally, truth must always be a complete defense. See
Garrison
16 v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 73.
See note 7 supra.
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fled privilege"' 7 or right of "fair comment" under the general law
of libel as developed by traditional common law methods and
legislation in practically all state jurisdictions. The precise nature
of the privilege and the circumstances giving rise to it varied
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It would be beyond the scope
of this article to discuss in detail the myriad facets of the rules
applying in the various jurisdictions-nor is this necessary since it
has been thoroughly done elsewhere.' 8 For our purposes here, a
few generalizations will suffice.
Under the general law of libel, if one publishes a libelous
statement of another in a non-privileged situation, good faith is
not a defense,' 9 although it may be proved in mitigation of
damages.2 Further, if the libel falls into that category of publications denominated "libelous per se," i.e., gravely defamatory on
their face, substantial recovery is permitted even though the
plaintiff sustained no actual damage. 2 ' This was one of the prime
2 In the face of
considerations in the New York Times decision.m
contrary precedents,m the Supreme Court held that first amendment freedoms were indeed at stake.2 4 The essence of the libel
law's qualified privilege for publications on matters of public concern is to relieve the publisher from the strict liability which applies to non-privileged publications.2 5 However, as the term implies, this "qualified" privilege can be abused, and thereby for17 As distinguished from the absolute privilege applying to statements made,
for example, in the course of judicial or legislative proceedings. No action lies as
to such statements, regardless of the existence of malice. See W. Pnossim, TORTS
§ 109 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as liossma].
18 Berney, supra note 1, at 4-17.
1
9 PnossLn 791-93.
20 Id. at 828.
21
The classic exampl.s of publications defamatory per se were those which
imputed to the plaintiff the commission of a crime or affliction with a loathsome
disease, damaged him in his business or profession, or imputed unchastity to a
woman. But where libel is concerned a fifth category has been added by modem
courts, namely anything which tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the
community. See Pnossua 772-82; Afro-American Pub. Co. v. Jaffe, 866 F.2d 649
(D.C.22 Cir. 1966).
This concept was used by the Alabama courts to inflict damages of half
a million dollars on a locally unpopular northern newspaper.
23 See note 7 supra.
24 376 U.S. at 277-78.
25 The qualified privilege to speak on matters of public concern is but one
facet of a much broader category of qualified privilege, which includes any
publication "fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private
duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, in matters
where his interest is concerned." PnossmE 805. E.g., the report of a school official
to a parent regarding the conduct of his son would enjoy such privilege. See
Baskett v. Crossfield, 190 Ky. 751, 228 S.W. 673 (1921).
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feited, and under the general law this forfeiture may readily
occur. 26

Here the Supreme Court's New York Times rule, based on the
first amendment, differs significantly from preexisting state law.
While the law of many states stated that the qualified privilege
was forfeited if the defamatory statement was one of fact rather
than opinion,27 New York Times ruled that false statements of
fact are protected, subject to the actual malice limitation. 23 Under
state law the existence of ill-will or "malice"- could defeat the
privilege, but under the constitutional rule the significant factor
is knowledge of the falsity of the statement made rather than
animosity toward the person about whom it is made.30 Also, under
the constitutional doctrine, the burden of establishing actual
malice is placed squarely on the plaintiff, and is apparently one
requiring clear and- convincing evidence.3 1 The plaintiff cannot
be aided by presumptions in meeting this burden. *S
The policy behind such a doctrine as applied to politicians is,
of course, apparent. While political rhetoric is not always as vivid
as that used by the partisan who described the opposition's
candidate as a "whore-hopper, a drunkard, and a grafter,"'' vehement language is the rule. rather than the exception. Or, as the
Court put it in New York Times:
[W e consider this case against the baclaxnmd of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials.
* 0

0

*

In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
26

IRossE

819-28.

814-15; Associated Press v. Walker, 898 S.W.2d 671 (TeM Civ. App.
1965), revd 888 U.S. 180 (1967).
28876
U.S. at 271-75.
29
2 1d.

0

PROSSEa 816.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 64, 78 (1964). There, it seemed clear
that Garrison's attacks on the judges were motivated by political if not personal
animosity. See also Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 862 F.2d 188, 198
(8th Cir. 1966); Grabavoy v. Wilson, 280 N.E.2d 581 (Ill. 1967); Slbowitz v.
3

Lepper, 55 Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1967).
81 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 876 U.S. at 285-86.
82 Id. at 288-84. Under the law of many states, a presumption of malice
arose upon the plaintiff's proving the publication of a statement that was libelous
per se. PRossER 790-91.
38 See Weinstein v. Rhorer, 240 Ky. 679, 42 S.W.2d 892 (1981).
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sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at
times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification... and even to
false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained
in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view,
essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part
of the citizens of a democracy.
.... erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and...
must be protected, if the freedoms of expression are to have
the 'breathing space' they need to survive.....84
While all can appreciate the Court's concern for free speech
in the political arena, and most will agree that a "rule compelling
the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount" is equivalent to a form of censorship, 85 one
cannot deny that the New York Times doctrine has given birth to
many new problems as it has evolved over the four years of
existence.
C. Problems With the New York Times Doctrine
Hardly had the rule of New York Times been handed down,
before it became apparent that it was going to prove extremely
difficult to determine to whom the doctrine applied. Who was a
public official in the Times sense? Obviously, most, if not all,
elected officials were, even though the elected office might be a
minor one, such as that of a school board member" or a local tax
assessor, 37 or a police court clerk. 38 But what about a policeman
or deputy sheriff, 39 a local election official or political committee34376 U.S. at 270.
3i
Id. at 279.
3
6See Cabin v. Community Newspapers, Inc., 27 App. Div. 548, 275
N.Y.S.2d
896 (1966).
37
See Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J. Sup. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (1966).
38
See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 86 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Nov.
7, 1967).
39 See Henry v. Collins, 880 U.S. 356 (1965). Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc. 2d
212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1965), and Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.
1965) (where policemen involved in civil rignts controversies were held subject
to New York Times). See also Thompson v. St. Amant, 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d
255, 261 (1967) (deputy sheriff), rev'd on other grounds in St. Amant v.
T.ompson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4888 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1962). But cf. Tucker v. Kilgore,
888 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1964) (policeman involved in minor fracas); Coursey v.
Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 227 N.E.2d 164 (Ill. App. 1967)
(village patrolman).
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man,40 a deputy town derk,41 the supervisor of a branch postoffice,4 or an attorney or accountant retained by a local administrative body?43 In New York Times the Court implied that not
everyone on the public payroll would be subject to the public
official designation and specifically left the matter open for future
case-by-case determination."
The Supreme Court was itself confronted with the problem in
Rosenblatt v. Baer,45 a case that had been tried initially prior to
the Times decision but which was delayed in reaching the Court.
In Rosenblatt, the manager of a county-owned ski resort, who had
been directly responsible to the county commissioners, left his
position after a public controversy concerning the efficiency of the
resort's operation. A local newspaper columnist who had been an
avid proponent of the managerial change, in commenting on its
beneficial effects and the increase in income since it had occurred,
pointedly speculated in print: "What happened to all the money
last year? and every other year?" Claiming that the column accused
him of embezzlement, the ex-manager recovered damages in a
libel action which ultimately reached the Court on certiorari.
Judgment was reversed in favor of the manager and the case was
remanded to the state court for a new trial on the issue of whether
the column could constitutionally be taken to refer to the plaintiff,
as opposed to being so general as to constitute only a libel of
government. The state court was instructed to hear new evidence
as to whether the plaintiff was a "public official" in the New
York Times sense. Guidelines were prescribed for the lower courts
to follow in making this crucial determination:
Where a position in government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it,
beyond the
general public interest in the qualifications and performance
40

See McNabb v. Tennesseean Newspapers, Inc., 400 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn.
App. 1965) (Election offcial); News Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166
(Del. 1967) (Political committeeman).
4' See Duffy v. Kipers, 26 App. Div. 2d 127, 271 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1966).
42 See Sflbowitz v. Lepper, 55 Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1967).
43 See Zeck v. Spiro, 52 Misc. 2d 629, 276 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1966); Krutech v.
Schimmel, 26 App. Div. 2d 1052, 272 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1966).
441n a footnote the Court said, 'Wehave no occasion here to determine how
far down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official'
designation would extend . . .or otherwise to specify categories of persons who
would or would not be included." 376 U.S. at 283n.23.
45 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
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of all government
employees,.., the New York Times malice
46
standards apply.
But the question of defining who is a public official did not
begin to exhaust the problems arising under the New York Times
rule. The question of whether the doctrine applied to nonofficials in the public eye became even more crucial. It is easily
seen that if an officeholder who is running for re-election is to
be burdened with the "actual malice" rule of Times in defending
himself against political vituperation, his opponent, who is not yet
an officeholder however much he might like to become one, must
be saddled with the same burden if the "spirited public debate"
47
sought to be insured by Times is to take place on an equal basis.
One decision has even held that an officeholder's law partner is
subject to the rule when a discussion of the official's legal ethics

inevitably involves those of the partner.48
Only three months after the Times decision it was suggested
that the policy of the rule required that it be applied to one who
was not in political life at all, but was a "participant in public
debate on an issue of grave public concern." 49 Nor was it long
before this defense was being invoked by defendants in every sort
of case in which there was any possible claim that the circumstances involved matters of public interest. 0 For the most part, the
lower courts refused to extend the doctrine very far beyond public
officials. The great majority of decisions occurring during this
46 Id. at 86.
47 See McFadden v. Detroit Bar Ass'n, 145

N.W.2d 285 (Mich. 1965); Dyer
v. Davis,
189 So.2d 678 (La. 1966).
8
4 Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), afd
260 N.Y.S.2d
29, 207 N.E.2d 620 (1965); Note, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 241 (1965).
4
9 Pauling v. News Syndicate Co. 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964) (dicta),
suggested that the Times rule should be applied to one who voluntarily issued
public statements on controversial issues and, as a result thereof, had been
accused by a newspaper editorial of being a Communist sympathizer with unAmerican overtones. See also, Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362
F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966) and Pauling v. National Rev., Inc., 269 N.Y.S. 2d 11
(1966), where the courts enforced the full rigor of the Times rule against the
same individual in square holdings.
50 E.g., labor union disputes. In Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of
America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), a labor union, which had been sued for
libel arising out of charges and countercharges occurring in the heat of an
organization campaign claimed the protection of New York Times. The Supreme
Court applied the Times doctrine 'by analogy, rather than under constitutional
compulsion." 383 U.S. at 65. Cf. B. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 154 S.E.2d 344 (N.C. 1967). See also Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110
( D. Conn. 1966) (prisoner found to be public figure in suit by him for
amages for invasion of privacy resulting from a television documentary).

IEmrTucxy LAw JouNAL[

[Vol

.56,

period declined to apply it in cases involving sports figures,5 1
entertainers, 52 and socialites.53 The courts were divided 54 over
whether the doctrine should be applied to those who had thrust
themselves "into the vortex of the discussion of a question of
pressing public concern." This was a question that the Supreme
Court had specifically left unanswered. 55
Law review comment was virtually unanimous in agreement
that the public official categorization was too rigid and inflexible
to be the sole criterion for the application of the Times doctrine5 6
On the one hand, there were some very minor officials to whom the
doctrine probably should not apply; however, there were persons
who were not officials but in whose activities the public had a
legitimate interest. Commentators differed as to just where the
line should be drawn. Most, however, seemed to feel that some
sort of "legitimate public concern" test should constitute the
criterion, i.e., if the matters discussed in the publication out of
which the defamation arose were of legitimate public concern, the
57
New York Times doctrine should apply
Some such test would seem to be not only the most workable
and intelligible criterion, but also the one which most fairly
resolves the conflict between freedom of expression and individual
51
See, e.g., Dempsey v. Tim., Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186
(1964), aff'd 254 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1965); Spabn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d
324, 52
221 NE.2d 543 (1966), revd 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
See, e.g., Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372 (1964);
cert. denied,
380 U.S. 916 (1965); Mason v. Sullivan, 271 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1966).
8
S Lorillard v. Field Enterprises,' Inc., 65 M. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1
(1965).
54 Compare Linus Pauling cases, supra note 46, Walker v. Courier Journal
Co 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev'd on other grounds 368 F.2d 189
(6th Cir. 1966); Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., 413 P.2d 711 (Alas. 1966)
(adopting the New York Times rule as rule of state law); and Walker v.
Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1966) with Powell v. Monitor Publishing
Co., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966); Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp.
595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); and Walker v. Kansas City Star Co., 406 S.W.2d 44
(Mo. 1966). Cf. Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 48 Misc. 2d.
700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1965).
55
56 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 86 n.12.
See, e.g., Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1, 40-41 (1965); Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men, 52
A.B.A.J. 657 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel, The
Modern Revised Translation, 49 Comqr. L.Q. 581 (1964); Note, The Scope of
First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L.J. 642
(166); Note, Free Speech and Defamation of Public Persons; The Expanding
Doctrine of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 52 CoRNnLL L.Q. 419 (1967).
57See Berney, supra note 56 at 45-46; Bertelsman, sapra note 56 at 661;
Pedrick, supra note 56 at 592-93; Note, 75 YALE L.J., supra note 56 at 645; Note,
ComimL L.Q., supra note 56 at 425; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 91 (con-

curring opinion).
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personality explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court. 58 The
extent to which it has been adopted by the Court is the next topic
to be discussed.
III. TiH

1967 SuPREME COURT CASES

During its 1966 term, the Supreme Court continued to stake
out the boundaries of the New York Times doctrine. Although
already having briefly mentioned that term's cases by way of
introduction, at this point a rather detailed analysis of each is
required if the complexities of the Court's exegesis of the text of
New York Times are to be fully understood.
A. Time, Inc. v. Hill
As was pointed out above, Time, Inc. v. Hill59 involved, not a
libel suit, but a suit for the invasion of right of privacy. The action
was founded on New York's right of privacy statutes.60 Although
the writer of the article concerning the new play, "Desperate
Hours", (which had been based on a novel by the play's author
Joseph Hayes), had stated that the novel and play were based on
the experiences of the Hill family while being held captive by
escaped convicts, the truth was that the story had not been shaped
by any single incident. Rather, it was an amalgamation of several
actual instances about which the author had gathered information for many years. 61 The author of the article had conferred with
the playwright, but had not asked specifically whether the play
was based entirely on the Hills' experience. However, the writer
of the article did have on file several news clippings which revealed that the Hills' experience was of an entirely different
character than that depicted in the play. Although the first draft
of the article had not mentioned the Hills specifically, and had
stated merely that the play was a "somewhat fictionalized" account
58
See note 180 infra, and accompanying text.
59 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
60 These statutes, as pointed out by the Supreme Court began as a prohibition

of the use of a person's name or picture for purposes of commercial advertising
without his consent. 385 U.S. at 380. Over the years, the New York courts had
engrafted onto the statute an exception where matters of public interest were concerned. As interpreted by the courts, the application of the New York privacy
statutes was not significantly different than right of privacy rules evolved by other
states through common law methods. PaossEa 830, 840.

61385 U.S. at 393.
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of an incident which had occurred in suburban Philadelphia, the
copy editor rewrote the article so that the text emphasized the
derivation of the play from the Hill incident. The New York
courts awarded Mr. Hill $30,000 compensatory damages for the
article's invasion of his right of privacy. On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the New York Times doctrine of
actual malice was applicable under the circumstances.
Several significant points should be emphasized about the
case. First, Mr. Hill was certainly not a public official like the
police commissioner in New York Times or the judges in Garrison.
Nor was he even a borderline public official like the ski resort
manager in Rosenblatt or a public figure in the sense that General
Walker,6 2 Linus Pauling,63 and Warren Spahn64 have been so
categorized. Indeed, Mr. Hill had done all that he could to avoid
publicity, including moving himself and his family away from the
scene of their harrowing experiences. He made no attempt to insert himself, or his family, before the public eye, as the persons
mentioned above had done. Secondly, although this was a violation
of privacy action, not a libel suit, it nonetheless turned on misstatements of facts in the publication out of which it arose.
This apparent anomaly is explained by the long-standing conflict between enforcement of the right of privacy and freedom of
the press."5 In recognition of this conflict, the privacy cases had
long held that even those persons having nothing to do with
political affairs have, to some extent at least, lost their right of
privacy if they have caught the public attention either voluntarily,
such as by becoming a celebrity in some field of endeavor, or involuntarily, such as being the victim of crime. 66 The New York
courts had so held in a privacy case involving Warren Spahn, the
noted baseball pitcher, shortly before the Supreme Court decided
the Hill case.6 7 But in an effort to strike a balance between the
62

See note 82 infra, and accompanying text.

63 See note 49 supra, and accompanying text.

64The Spahn litigation is particularly important in evaluating the Hill case.
See note
67 infra, and accompanying text.
6
5 See PsossER 844 passim; Sriegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal MagazineThe 66
Celebrity's Right to Privacy, 30 So. CAr. L. REv. 280, 288 (1957).
PRoSSa 847.
67Spahm v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966).
Spa n had recovered damages and had obtained an injunction restraining violation
of his right of privacy by the publication of an unauthorized biography in which
many details of his personal life were erroneously described. However, the details,
(Continued on next page)
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protection of individual personality and the public's right to
know, they held that the element of substantial fictionalization 8
for commercial purposes had infringed upon Hill's and Spahn's
privacy rights despite the public's interest in them.6 9
This effort was regarded sympathetically by the Court when
the cases of Hill and Spahn came before it, but the majority felt
that more was required if the press was to be unhampered in reporting public events. Thus, the Court in Hill responded to the
New York Court of Appeals' statement in Spahn that "no public
interest is served" by the "fictitious biography" of Warren Spahn
and th:.t it perceived "no constitutional infirmities" in enjoining
70
its publications:
If this is meant to imply that proof of knowing or reckless
falsity is not essential to a constitutional application of the
statute in these cases, we disagree....
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve
of political expression or comment upon public affairs,
essential as those are to healthy government.... Exposure of
the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life
in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary
value on freedom of speech and of press .... 'No suggestion
can be found in the constitution that the freedom there
guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to
the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression....-rz Erroneous statement is no less inevitable in
such case than in the case of comment upon public affairs,
and in both, if innocent of merely negligent, 'it must be protected if the freedoms of expression 72are to have the 'breathin space' that they 'need to survive.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

though embarrassing, were apparently not libelous, because not derogatory. The
Supreme Court quoted extensively from the Spahn decision in the Hill opinion,
relying on the interpretation the right of privacy statutes had received by the
New York Court of Appeals. See 385 U.S. at 383. Spahn was also before the
Supreme Court on certiorari and subsequently was remanded for reconsideration in the light of the Hill decision. 387 U.S. 239 (1967) (per curiam). If the
Court considered Spabn in any way a different type of public figure than Mr.
Hill, the opinion in Hill gives no evidence of it.
681id. See also Note, Privacy, Defamaton and the First Amendment: The
Implications
of Time, Inc., v. Hill, 67 COLIJ . L. Rxv. 926, 931, 932 (1967).
0
9 Prosser places this type of privacy case in the category "False Light in
the Public Eye,' and points out that it is very closely related to certain types of
libel actions. Paossan 837-39.
70 385 U.S. at 387.
71 Quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
72
Quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272.
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Justices Black and Douglas joined the majority opinion "in
order for the Court to be able at this time to agree on an opinion
in this important case." 73 but filed concurring opinions reiterating

their belief that the first amendment requires that the press be
immune from libel and privacy suits arising out of the reporting
of public affairs.7 4 Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that the case should be remanded, because he felt that there had not been "binding jury interpretation
of the degree of fault involved in the fictionalization" by the Life
article. 8 But he dissented in the majority's finding that saddling
Mr. Hill with the onerous burden of the New York Times actual
malice test, with its requirement of proving "calculated falsehood", was necessary to preserve freedom of the press. He felt that
the primary policy underlying the New York Times rule was to
insure free competition in the marketplace of ideas, 76 and that
there was a "vast difference in the state interest in protecting
individuals like Mr. Hill from irresponsibly prepared publicity
77
and the state interest in similar protection for a public official."
He therefore advanced the proposition that requiring the press to
adhere to a duty of reasonable care, such as that imposed on other
professions, would sufficiently safeguard first amendment guarantees in cases like Mr. Hill's.78 Justice Harlan's opinion is of great
importance because it was he who wrote the plurality opinion,
adopting a somewhat similar negligence test, in the Butts-Walker
cases which are presently the last word concerning the effect of
New York Times on persons who are not public officials.
B. The Butts-Walker Cases
On the last day of the 1966 term, the Supreme Court handed
down one opinion deciding two consolidated cases which are of
extreme importance. These are the cases of Curtis PublishingCo.
v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.79
A jury in federal district court in Georgia had awarded Butts
73
74 385 U.S. at 398.
They had expressed similar views in separate opinions in New York Times
and Rosenblatt v. Baer.

75 385 U.S. at 404.

76 Id. at 406. Cf. Bertelsman, supra note 56 at 660.
77 385 U.S. at 408.
78Id. at 409.
79 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
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$60,000 general damages and $3,000,000 punitive damages in a
libel action arising out of an article published in The Saturday
Evening Post. Entitled "The Story of a College Football Fix," the
article was written in a style that strongly suggested deliberate
sensationalism. It purported to describe how Butts, the athletic
director and head football coach of the University of Georgia, had
conspired with Paul "Bear" Bryant to rig a football game between
Georgia and the University of Alabama. According to the article,
one George Burnett, as the result of an electronic mixup, had
accidentally overheard a telephone conversation between Butts and
Bryant, Alabama's coach, which took place approximately one
week prior to the game. Burnett allegedly heard Butts give Bryant
a detailed description of Georgia's plays and strategy. The article
concluded with the prediction that "careers would be ruined" as
a result of the disclosures.
The evidence presented at trial concerning both the content
of the telephone conversation overheard by Burnett and the
events of the football game itself was conflicting. Burnett was
revealed to be an extremely unreliable source, having previously
been placed on probation in connection with bad check charges.
Yet, the Post had published his version of the story without
making an independent investigation. Further, Butts had gotten
wind of the impending publication of the article, and his daughter
had literally pleaded with the editors of the Post to cancel its
publication.80 The editors turned a deaf ear. One of them testified
at the trial that the Post had deliberately instituted a policy of
"sophisticated muck-racking" and was looking for an opportunity
to publish a sensational expose of some sort.
The case had been brought in the federal district court prior
to the decision in New York Times. On a motion for a new trial
after the New York Times decision, the trial court determined
that Times was inapplicable, since Butts was not a public official.8 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
one judge dissenting.8 2
The Walker case presented a somewhat different situation.
Amid the turmoil and confusion of the riot which ensued during
80 388 U.S. at 161 n. 23.
Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ca. 1964).
82 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
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the enforced enrollment of a Negro, James Meridith, as a student
at the University of Mississippi, a young Associated Press correspondent reported an eye-witness account of events. The correspondent's dispatch stated that retired General Walker, a well
known personage who had once commanded federal troops during
a similar forced integration of schools in Little Rock, Arkansas,
had "led a charge of students against federal marshals on the Old
Miss campus," and "had assumed... complete command" over
the crowd. The dispatch further reported that Walker had
"advised" the rioters "on several tactics," including methods of
combating tear gas.8
Needless to say, at the trial, Walker vehemently disputed the
accuracy of the Associated Press report. According to his version
of the facts, he had advised the crowd to show moderation and
nonviolence, but they had rejected his counsel. Walker stated that
he had never come closer than the length of a football field to the
marshals against whom he had allegedly "led a charge." He also
disputed many other facts contained in the dispatch, contending
that he had been on the campus solely as an observer. s
The Associated Press dispatch had been widely reprinted
throughout the country, and the case that came before the
Supreme Court in June, 1967, was only one of many that Walker
had instituted against newspapers which had carried the Associated Press release.8, In the case decided by the Supreme Court,
a Texas jury had awarded Walker $500,000 general damages and
$300,000 exemplary damages, but the trial court found that there
was no evidence of malice to support the award for exemplary
damages and set that portion aside. The Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas affirmed, dismissing the Associated Press' constitutional
88
arguments in two sentences.
The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in ButtsWalker is extremely difficult to interpret, because there was no
opinion of the Court. Four justices joined in a plurality opinion,
83 The dispatch is quoted at length in the lower court opinion. Associated
Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
84 A detailed account of the evidence is given Id. at 675.
85 According to the Associate Press's brief in the Supreme Court, Walker had
filed at least fifteen actions seeking damages totalling $33,250,000. Brief for
Petitioner at 42-43, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v.
Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Some of the reported decisions in these cases are
cited8supra note 54.
6 Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671, 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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which enunciated what is perhaps best described as a "gross
negligence test"87 for libel actions by "public figures" who are not
public officials. Applying this test to the Butts-Walker situations,
the plurality felt that on their respective facts Butts should be
affirmed and Walker reversed. 8
The Chief Justice concurred in the result reached by the
plurality in both cases, but filed a separate opinion stating his
view that "public figures" as well as "public officials," should
be subject to the actual malice test of New York Times. Justices
Brennan and White agreed that the New York Times test should
be applied to "public figures," but expressed the view that Butts
should be reversed as well as Walker inasmuch as the Butts instructions in the court below were not sufficient under New York
Times standards, even though the evidence would have supported
a finding of actual malice. Justices Black and Douglas reaffirmed
their position that the press should enjoy complete immunity from
libel and invasion of privacy actions, at least insofar as matters of
public interest are concerned. They concurred in Walker with
Chief Justice Warren, so that the Court might arrive at an opinion.
They dissented in Butts.8 9
When the various opinions in Butts-Walker are carefully
analyzed, one finds that although only four justices support the
application of the "gross negligence test" to libel actions by
"public figures" who are not "public officials," five of the justices
favor the application of the New York Times actual malice test
or a stricter view to such persons. The opinion of Justices Black
and Douglas indicates that, if their view of absolute immunity
cannot prevail, they prefer the application of the New York
Times test to public figures, as advocated by the Chief Justice.
Thus, it appears that the leading opinion in these cases, even
though it expressed the views of more justices than joined in any
one of the other opinions filed, does not set forth the authoritative
87 For

the exact wording of the rule of the plurality opinion see text at

note 4, supra. The test seems substantially identical to the usual definition for
"gross negligence," i.e., "an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care." PuossER 187. In an article appearing after this one had been submitted
for publication, Professor Kalven also stated his view that the term "gross
negligence" was properly descriptive of the standard applied by the plurality.
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 298.
88 388 U.S. at 156.
89 ld. at 170.
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test. Rather, lower courts, unless and until the Supreme Court
speaks again, should follow the views of a majority of the justices
and should apply the New York Times test to libel actions by
public figures, as well as those by public officials. 0 For the reasons
hereafter stated, it is hoped that when the Court does speak again,
it will reaffirm that the actual malice test of New York Times
applies to public figures, as well as to public officials.
IV.

Ti

NEw YoRK TImES DoaumNE

AND THE

Fiasr

AmENDMENT

A. The Basic Approach of New York Times-A Qualified
PrivilegeFor a BorderlineArea.
Most of those who have commented on this subject have expressly or implicitly approved the approach of New York Times,
i.e., offering a qualified, rather than an absolute, privilege for
defamatory publications concerning public officials. 91 At least one
commentator, however, has asserted a dissenting view, stating that
inasmuch as the Supreme Court has no common law powers to
fabricate tort law for the states, any interference with such tort
92
rules must be based on a constitutionally relevant standard.
Therefore, he reasons, the Court had no power to promulgate a
doctrine of qualified privilege in this area. But once it decided
90 An opinion by less than a majority of the Court is not a binding precedent.
Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). But there is authority for adhering to the views of a majority of the justces although they did not concur in
one opinion. 1B J. MoonE, FEDEA.
PRAcncE I 0.402(2)n.27, at 119 (2d ed.
1965) and cases there cited. Cf. Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear Majority
Decisions: A Study in Stare DecIsis, 24 U. Cm. L. Rav. 99 (1956). At least three
courts have squarely held that the New York Times actual malice test, rather than
the gross negligence test, applies to public officials. Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579, 588-89 (5th Cir. 1967); News Journal Co. v.
Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166 (Del. 1967); Grayson v. Curtis Publishing Co., 436 P.2d
756 (Wash. 1967). Professor Kalven agrees that the New York Times rule "has
won across the board." Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendments
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 278. See Rose v. Koch, 154
N.W.2d 409, 429 (Minn. 1967), where the actual malice test was applied to one
who was a public official part of the time hut merely a public figure at other
times. But see Haimbaugh, The Second Front: Free Expression Versus Individual
Dignity, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 126, 144-48 (1967); Note, ConstitutionalLawDefamation under the First Amendment-The Actual Malice Test and "Public
Figures,"
46 N. CAR. L. REv. 392, 397 (1968).
91
See, e.g., Bertelsman, supra note 56 it 661; Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT.
REv. 191; Note, 52 CoRmN.r L.Q., supra note 56 at 430; Note, 75 YA.E L.J.,
supra92note 56 passim. But see Note, 35 U. C'. L. REv. 685 (1966).
Bemey, Supra note 56 at 49-50.
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that the first amendment required that defamatory speech about
public officials be protected, the Court was precluded from
qualifying that protection and had to make it absolute.
This criticism merits consideration. If the first amendment protects one's right to advocate the election of a political candidate,
few would contend that the government should have the power to
determine whether one truly believed in that candidate's superior
qualifications and could prohibit all political advocacy that was
insincere. How, then, can the New York Times rule be justified,
for it looks to the speaker's state of mind to determine whether
the factually erroneous statements he has made concerning public
affairs were made with knowledge that they were false or with
reckless disregard of the truth? It is believed that such justification is indeed found in the history of libel vis-4-vis the first amendment. As pointed out above, libel, together with obscenity, was
for a long time regarded as outside the ambit of the first amendment's protective pale. 93 Professor Kalven has called this concept
the two-level theory, i.e., the technique of "dividing speech into
categories: that which is worthy enough to require the application
of first amendment protection and that which is beneath first
amendment concerns." 94
It has been said that the New York Times line of decisions is
an implementation of the theories Alexander Meiklejohn advocated for many years. 95 Certainly, he had long been in the forefront of those who, eschewing any "balancing" or "dear and
present danger" test, asserted that the first amendment was an
absolute. Yet, in his writings, the "qualified privilege" approach
of New York Times finds theoretical justification.
First of all, Meiklejohn sharply distinguished between public
constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech and religion, which
he held to be absolute, and private constitutional rights, such as
the right to own property, which were subject to abridgement with
due process of law. 96 As applied to the regulation of libelous exSee note 7 supra, and accompanying text.
Kalven, supra note 91 at 217. This is to be distinguished from Kalven's
"two-tier theory," i.e., that the first amendment is less restrictive on the states
than 95
it is on the federal government. Id. at 218.
See Kalven, supra note 91 at 209, 221; [Mr. Justice] Brennan, The Supreme
03

94

Court and the Meikeohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 H~Av. L.

REv. 1 (1965).
96 A. M= jom, PoLrncAL Ftamno,
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pression, this basic principle yielded the corollary that "[t]hough
private libel is subject to legislative control, political or seditious
libel is not."9 7 In a very effective analogy, Meiklejohn once compared the rationale which at that time excluded libel from first
amendment protection, to the rules of order which prevail at a
town meeting. There, he pointed out, while the basic principle of
the meeting is "that the freedom of speech shall be unabridged,"
the meeting cannot proceed "unless, by common consent, speech
is abridged.""" That is, there must be rules governing who shall
be permitted to speak and when, and requiring that only the subject on the floor may be discussed at a given time. Further, if a
speaker "is abusive or in other ways threatens to defeat the purpose
of the meeting, he may be and should be declared 'out of order.'"
If the speaker then persists in objectionable conduct, sanctions
may be imposed by denying him the floor or having him "thrown
out" of the meeting.99 Such regulation may be compared to the
government's right, with respect to freedom of assembly, to require that the assembly be "peaceable."' 0 Although "no one may
be 'denied the floor' on the ground of disapproval of what he is
saying or would say," vituperation directed at individuals destroys
the peaceable nature of the assembly and one who persists in such
conduct is rightfully expelled by force, if necessary.' 0x
To apply this analogy to the New York Times situation, it
might be said that the Supreme Court has found it necessary under
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

TM PEOPLE 8-9 (1960); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961
Sup. CT. RE:., 245, 258; Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?,

20 U. Cm. L. REv. 461 (1953). Accord, Emerson, Toward A General Theory of
the First
Amendment, 72 YAI.E L.J. 877, 922-24 (1963).
97
Meildejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245, 259.
98 A. MEIKLEjonm, PoLrrcAL FkEiEom, TH CoNsTrnoN..L PowERs or
THE PEOPLE 24-25 (1960).
99 Id. See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SuP. CT. REv. 1, 12; "[W]hat is required is in effect a set of Roberts Rules of
Order for the new uses of the public forum ... " Cf. Brant's suggestion that the
theoretical justification for permitting the suppression of obscenity is to treat it
"as disorderly action akin to nakedness in a public street." I. BRANT, THE BmL OF
Thcsrrs 492 (1965). An analogy may also be drawn to the reasoning of the Court
in Cox v. Louisiana, 879 U.S. 536 (1965) upholding a conviction of a civil rights
leader for blocking a public sidewalk during a demonstration. Stressing the interest
of the municipality in insuring the free flow of traffic, the Court pointed out that
no one could "insist upon a street meeting in the middle of Times Square at the
rush hour
as a form of freedom of speech or assembly." Id. at 554.
100 Meildejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245, 259.
101 Id. at 260.
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modem conditions to amend the rules of order controlling the
procedure in that tremendous town meeting by which our nation
is governed. The Court has found that, in the face of the
exigencies of modem life, if "debate on public issues" which are
brought up at that meeting is to be "uninhibited, robust, and
wide open," then the rules of order must be somewhat relaxed.
But this does not change the principle that rules of order are not
in themselves an abridgment of free speech. In times when events
and communications moved more slowly it was possible for a
speaker to check the accuracy of what he said in public debate.
However, in modem times of instant communication, where life
is more complex in general, complete checking to insure absolute
accuracy is impossible. Today when social advocacy for one position or the other takes place to a significant degree in what has
been called "the public forum,"1 0 2 the competition of ideas in the
marketplace of which Holmes spoke long ago' 0 3 occurs, not only,
or even primarily, in lecture halls, but in the streets, at lunch
counters, on courthouse lawns, or, through the miracles of modem
electronics, in our very living rooms. And this is a salutary development. What could be more beneficial to a free society, dependent
for its survival upon adequately educating and informing the
electorate, than to have reports of public events continously communicated to the electorate? When significant events throughout
this world, and indeed on other worlds, are flashed to us every
hour on the hour, the primary need is for information now. In
such a climate, there must be room for good faith factual errors,
and, even more, "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials"' 104 must be permitted, if political freedom is to be achieved. But, deliberate misrepresentation or "calculated falsehood" does not promote the
ends of free competition of ideas in the vast town meeting of the
electorate. It leads to disorder and confusion, and the exigencies
of the public forum do not yet require the modification of the old
102 See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 1.

103 "BUt when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe ... that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas,-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the comnetition of the market .... That, at any rate, is the
theory of our Constitution." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(dissenting opinion).
104 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
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rules of order to the extent of allowing speech or writings of this
kind.105
The rules of order presently in effect, as expounded by New
York Times and its progeny, involve a borderline area. They are,
after all, concerned with an individual's attempts to seek redress
for expression concerning himself, not with official punitive attempts by government to suppress political dissension. It is just
these distinctions, it is submitted, that provide the key to the
understanding and theoretical justification of New York Times.
The concept of seditious libel provides the touchstone. 0 6 One
scholar has advanced the thesis that the first amendment permits
"a line to be drawn between the spurious common law of seaitious libel and the genuine common law of civil liability for
defamation of private character."' 1 7 This thesis is borne out by
the New York Times line of cases. In fact, there are really two
doctrines of New York Times, one of which is the qualified
privilege doctrine of "actual malice" which we have spent most of
our time discussing here. The other is that where adverse comment is in such general terms as to amount to criticism of government rather than of an individual, it amounts to seditious libel,
and the privilege is not merely qualified, but is absolute. 08 Where
105 After the above was written, the Court re-emphasized this basic approach
to the delicate problems of free speech involved in this area:
But New York Times and succeeding cases have emphasized that the

stake of the people in public business and the conduct of public ofcials
is so great that neither the defense of truth nor the standard of ordinary
care would protect against self-censorship and thus adequately implement

First Amendment policies. Neither lies nor false communications serve
the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability

or further proliferation. But to insure the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First

Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.
We adhere to this view and to the line which our cases have drawn
between false communications which are protected and those which are
not.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4334 (U.S. Apr. 80, 1968).
106 Indeed, perhaps it is the key to the entire problem of defining freedom
of speech. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 204-10. For a
comprehensive treatment of the history of seditious libel, see BRANT supra note
99, chs. 9-18; Brant, Seditious Libels Myth and Reality, 39 N.Y.U. L. REzv. 1
(1964).
10
7 BRANT, supra note 99 at 502-03. Compare the comments of Mr. Justice
Stewart approving this approach in Rosenblatt v. Baer 383 U.S. at 93n.4.
108 In New York Times itself this was an independent ground for reversal.
376 U.S. at 288-92. Accord: Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 81-83. According to
(Continued on next page)
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the qualified privilege doctrine comes into play, we are not concerned with government itself, but individuals in government. A
fine line indeed must be drawn between accusations against
individuals and "impersonal discussion of governmental activity."'1° Suppose, for example that Garrison v. Louisiana had
been a civil, instead of a criminal case, and one of the eight
allegedly maligned judges had sued Garrison for damages. Would
his accusations, not having mentioned any of the judges by name,
have been so general as to have amounted to an attack on the
judicial branch of government itself and thus been immune as
seditious libel, even if made with actual malice? Or suppose, as is
often the case, someone charges that a city government is composed of grafters and cheats. Is this seditious libel, or a libel of a
small group, the city commissioners, any one of whom can collect
damages if he can prove actual malice?11 °
The New York Times doctrine lies not only somewhere between seditious libel and individual libel but also between
regulation of the incidents surrounding the exercise of free
speech, which the first amendment does not prohibit,"' and
regulation of its content, 1 2 which is strictly forbidden. The
principal thesis of this article is that the qualified immunity
afforded by New York Times is appropriate for this borderline
area.
To provide for the twilight zone, where factually erroneous
speech does not amount to seditious libel, but is not solely concerned with private reputation, because the subject under discussion concerns governmental affairs or one of the items for
sale in the "marketplace of ideas," the Court has fashioned a
borderline rule between uninhibited regulation and absolute im(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Professor Kalven, the major premise of the syllogism applied in New York Times
is: "The central meaning of the First Amendment is that seditious libel cannot
be made the subject of government sanction." Kalven, The New York Times
Case: a Note on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT.
REv. 0191, 209.
2 9 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 82.
110 See Id. at 81-83.
S IIE.g., excluding sound trucks blaring propaganda from residential streets.
See K'ovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
112 See Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. CT. REv. 1, 23, where the author states that "No one has ever argued that
speech should be free of the restraints of reasonable parliamentary rules, and any
concessions on this front should not be taken as relevant to the questions most
central to speech theory-questions of control of content."
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munity-the qualified privilege rule of New York Times."13 This
may, indeed, be balancing, but it is balancing of only a very
limited type.1 4 The wisdom of qualifying the privilege afforded
by New York Times is supported by a consideration of the policy
underlying the tort law of defamation which its constitutional
rule supersedes. One must remember that the New York Times
family of decisions are products of an unavoidable conflict which
is becoming more and more intense in our modem society. This
is the conflict between free speech and the need to protect the
personal dignity of the individual from destruction by false attacks upon his reputation, and from invasion of his right of
privacy. The public has an all but insatiable desire to be informed,
not only on political and governmental issues, but also on a
number of things which are really none of its business. Society has
a strong interest in shielding a football coach, or anyone else, from
a false accusation of corruption which will ruin his career. And
the more advanced a society is, the more alert it should be to protect its citizens, as far as possible, from mental suffering inflicted
upon them due to unnecessary invasions of their right of privacy. 1 5
The Supreme Court has pointed out that "whatever is added
to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate." 1 6 But
the converse is also true-whatever is added to the public domain,
is subtracted from the law's salutary protection of an individual's
reputation or right of privacy, and thus from his inherent human
dignity. This was no doubt why the Court refrained from
adopting privilege for defamation of public officials. The reasoning
underlying this resolution of conflicting interests could hardly be
113Commenting on the statement of the Court in Hill, quoted at note 70
supra, that "guaranties for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment on public affairs, Professor Kalven has said: "The point
left implicit, presumably, is that while the avoidance of seditious libel may be
the central purpose of the First amendment, it is not its only purpose. New
York Times v. Sullivan gave an invaluable perspective to free speech analysis;
it did not, however, attempt to set the outermost boundaries of First Amendment
protection." Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts,
and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 282.
114 See Emerson, supra note 96; Kalven, The New York Times Case: a Note
on "the Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 214217; Kalven, Upon Re-reading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
U.C.L.A.
L. RBv. 428, 442-44 (1967).
115 See generally authorities cited in note 1 supra.
116 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272, quoting Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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better expressed than it was by the Court itself in Rosenblatt v.
Baer:
Society has a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and
redressing attacks upon reputation. But in cases like the
present, there is tension between this interest and the values
nurtured by the First and Fourteenth amendments. The
thrust of New York Times is that when interests in public
discussion are particularly strong, as they were in that case,
limits the protections afforded by the law of
the Constitution
117
defamation.
We have attempted to show here that this approach is both valid
under the first amendment and necessary to a civilized society.
Some of its specific applications remain to be considered.
B. New York Times Today: Hard Cases and Public Figures
In Time, Inc. v. Hill and Butts-Walker the Supreme Court
conceded, as many had predicted it would have to do,118 that the
doctrine of New York Times could not be confined to public
officials.
Few would quarrel with subjecting General Walker to the
burdens of New York Times. He had, after all, deliberately engaged in the public affray where he had little right to ask for
quarter or special consideration. The very violence of the public
event into which he had thrust himself prevented meticulous
accuracy in reporting, and its urgent nature and national importance required that the public be immediately informed of
all developments. The General was no doubt aware of this, and
his efforts to capitalize on the alleged errors in the Associated
Press's dispatch smacked of a deliberate vendetta against the
northern press. It was very clear in his case that to have held the
wire service to absolute accuracy of fact would have constituted
a gross interference of the press's freedom, which is in the last
analysis the freedom of everyone.
As for the Butts decision, if the gross negligence test of the
plurality opinion ultimately becomes the prevailing rule there
are several indications that it may be one of those hard cases which
make bad law. There was at least one difficult issue in the case
117 383

U.S. at 86.

118 See authorities cited at note 56, supra.
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which the plurality tiptoed past with scarce a glance. Butts was
the athletic director of a large state university. Although his salary
did not come directly from public funds, his authority was of a
public nature. 119 Able judges in the lower courts have disagreed
on whether or not he was a "public official" in the New York
Times sense. 20 Yet the plurality evinced a suprising willingness
to be bound by those same "mere labels of state law" which it had
vehemently rejected in the Times opinion,121 blandly accepting
the rulings of the Georgia courts and one of its own rulings in an
entirely different context, to the effect that the office of Athletic
Director at the University of Georgia was not that of a public
official. 22
Prior to the announcement of the Butts-Walker opinion, it
had been suggested that the New York Times doctrine be applied
to cases arising out of "public issues" or "events"' 23 or even that
the controlling principle should be whether the publications
in issue were relevant to issues up for decision by the voting
public.124 Whether one or both of these approaches is used,
or an unadorned public official test, it is submitted that the considerations for applying the New York Times doctrine to Butts
were much more compelling than for applying it to the ski-resort
director in Rosenblatt v. Baer. Yet, we are told that the seven
members of the Court who found it necessary to pass upon the
question,125 agreed that Butts was a "public figure" in no way
different from General Walker. 2 6 No analysis was advanced to
support this proposition, nor was it explained why the position
Butts held was not "one which would invite public scrutiny and
discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the
388 U.S. at 135.
Compare the opinion of the court in Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F.
Supp. 390 (N.D. Ga. 1964) with that of the dissenting judge in Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965).
'21376 U.S. at 269. See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 84.
122 388 U.S. at 144. Curtis had also argued in its brief that, besides Butts'
"19
'20

possible public officialdom, the very subject matter of the Post article, higher
education and big-time college sports, entitled it to the protection of the New
York Times doctrine.
123 See note 56 supra.
124 Note, Free Speech and Defamation of Public Persons; The Expanding
Doctrine of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 52 CoRNML L.Q. 419 (1967).
125 Presumably, Justices Black and Douglas did not find it necessary to pass
on the question, since they would afford absolute immunity from libel suits in all
matters concerning public affairs.
1268388 U.S. at 162 (concurring opinion).
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scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in
controversy," the test for public officialdom enunciated in Rosenblatt,'2 7 and a test which would certainly seem to apply to the
office of athletic director of a large state university. Even more
significantly, the reasoning underlying the implicit but necessary
finding that the private citizen-plaintiff in Time, Inc. v. Hill, to
whom the full rigor of the New York Times actual malice test has
been applied, was more of a "public man" than the prominent
Coach Butts was not disclosed. 12s Further suspicion is aroused by
the unexpected appearance on the New York Times stage of the
gross negligence test of the plurality opinion. We cannot, of
course, know exactly to what degree the difficulty of the Butts
decision was responsible for this intrusion, but the vehicle of
"gross negligence" enabled the Court to finally decide Butts instead of remanding, as had been done in Rosenblatt and Hill, for
a re-trial under New York Times standards.
It is easy to sympathize with the obvious reluctance of several
members of the Court to subject Butts, who had been victimized
by an inexcusable kind of yellow journalism, to the ordeals of a
second trial, which would have been necessary if the Rosenblatt
approach had been adopted. As it was, only the Chief Justice was
willing to find that the actual instructions in the trial court had
adequately covered the requirements for New York Times' "actual
malice." And, although only one Justice voted for a negligence
test in Time, Inc. v. Hill, four were willing to adopt such a test,
albeit a somewhat more stringent one, in Butts-Walker. All of these
factors make one suspect the result desired in the Butts case was
the real parent of the gross negligence test. This test is objectionable not so much for itself, but for its inconsistency with New
York Times and the cases which followed it. In the first instance,
it would seem to have afforded almost as much protection to goodfaith factual error in publications imbued with the public interest
as the "actual malice" test actually laid down there. Indeed, perhaps it is only a useless exercise in semantics to attempt to distinguish "highly unreasonable conduct consituting an extreme
083 U.S. at 86n.13.
126The plurality opinion's apparent distinction of Time. Inc. v. Hill on the
ground that it is a privacy action does not seem adequate to explain this anomaly.
For in Hill the Court itself pointed out that such privacy cases are very similar
to actions sounding in libel per quod.
127
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departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
usually adhered to by responsible publishers"'129 from the "reckless
disregard of the truth" which constitutes the second half of the
"actual malice" definition. 130 But, it is submitted, it is inconsistent
to impose a greater burden on a private citizen thrown into the
public eye only for a brief moment, and then purely involuntarily
or a big-league pitcher in no way connected with governmental
affairs, than upon a policy-making official of a state university or a
person deliberately engaging in heated debate on issues of national
importance.
One justifiable criticism of the New York Times doctrine is
that the qualified nature of the privilege it affords will tend to give
rise to extensive litigation as plaintiffs in varying circumstances
argue that it does not apply to them or that they can meet the
difficult burden of proving actual malice. 13 1 In this writer's view
the public interest in preserving the integrity of the personality
outweighs this criticism, but if the gross negligance test is to be
applied, even finer distinctions will have to be drawn. 13 2 The
courts will not only have to distinguish between the public and
private spheres and define what considerations make a man a
public figure as opposed to a public official, but also where
violation of privacy based on "substantial fictionalization" ends
and libel begins. 3 3 If the Court is sincerely concerned with the
"self-censorship" effect of the very possibility of libel suits on the
freedom of the press, even though they may not result in a judgment, 3 4 and if it is going to devise common-law type rules to
attempt to resolve the ineluctable conflict between the interest of
129

I.e., the gross negligence formula. See notes 4 and 87, supra.

130 See note 15 supra.

131 Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at 95 (Black, J., dissenting).

182 In criticizing Justice Harlan's approach, primarily for its complexity and

unwieldiness, it was recently stated: "[The gross negligence test] ...makes at a
constitutional level more discriminations than two centuries of tort law has
worked out at the common-law level" Kalven, The Reasonable Mal. and the First
Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267, 290. But see Note,
The New York Times Rule and Society's Interest in Providing a Redress for
Defamatory Statements, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 424 (1967).
133The Spahn case had sounded in privacy rather than libel because,
although substantial fictionalization was involved, there was apparently nothing
derogatory in the spurious biography published about Spahn. But as the Time,
Inc. v. Hill opinion pointed out, such an action is very close to one sounding in
libel per quod. See note 125, supra. Nevertheless, under the rule of the ButtsWalker
plurality opinion, different tests would apply in libel and privacy actions.
13 4 See quotation at note 105 supra.
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character protection and the exigencies of the public forum,
should it not devise as simple a test as possible which constitutes
an equitable resolution of the conflict? Anyone who has put forth
the effort to follow this article to this late point must realize that
such a test is not the result if the gross negligence test of the
Butts-Walker plurality opinion is to be considered authoritative.
Happily, as has already been pointed out, it need not be considered authoritative, since it did not command the support of a
majority of the Court. 135
C. New York Times Today: The Public Event-A Foundation
ForFuture Growth.
If one assumes, then, that the gross negligence test will prove
to have been stillborn and that subsequent decisions will follow
the views of a majority of the Court that New York Times'
original actual malice test should be used in all cases where freedom of the press requires the shield of New York Times for its
protection, an insuperable obstacle to meaningful analysis of the
present state of the New York Times doctrine is overcome. For one
is then relieved of the task of attempting to rationalize how it is
that a free press has a more compelling interest in discussing the
affairs of a completely non-public man like Mr. Hill than in the
alleged rigging of a sporting event of national interest by a person
who is at least arguably a public official. Both these men can now,
together with advocates on various aspects of public issues and
major 5ports and entertainment personalities, be considered
"public figures"' 136 and subject to the full rigor of New York
Times. However laudable the consistency of such an approach may
be, some may feel that, at least in Mr. Hill's case, the public right
to be informed has infringed too far upon the individual's right
to be protected. To a lesser degree, such an argument may also be
r7
made for Spahn. 3
135

See note 90 supra, and accompanying text.

136 "A public figure has been defined as a person who by his accomplish-

ments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives
the public a legitimate int.!rest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become
a 'public nersonage."' PRossER 844-45.
137 "It is very well settled that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of
speech and of the press does not confer upon a newspapcr, anyone else, the
privilege of publishing defamation merely because it has news' value, and the
(continued on next page)
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To attempt to sum up the present status of the New York
Times doctrine, it would seem accurate to say that if the gross
negligence test of the Butts-Walker plurality opinion can be
considered non-authoritative, the Court has evolved a legitimate
public concern or public event criterion for the application of the
actual malice test. A reconciliation and analysis of the opinions,
but more especially the facts, of the New York Times family of
cases decided by the Supreme Court to date would seem to yield
the following rule, which applies to both libel and privacy
actions: No publisher of material the subject matter of which is a
"public event" that is, of legitimate public concern, may be required to respond in damages because of factual misstatement
therein, unless such misstatement was made with knowledge of its
falsity, or with reckless disregard for the truth.
The concept of the public event is to be given a broad and
comprehensive scope. Time, Inc. v. Hill and Butts-Walker indicate
that the Court has pretty much adopted Meiklejohn's delineation
of the public and private spheres. The public sphere includes not
only political issues, that is, those on which the people vote
directly, such as the relative merits of officials or candidates for
office, but also those collateral matters concerning which the
citizens must be informed if they are to be "educated for selfgovernment." 8
In Meiklejohn's own words:
[T] here are many forms of thought and expression within the
range of human communications from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values;
the capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far
as possible, a ballot should express. These, too, must suffer
no abridgment of their freedom. I list four of them below:
1. Education, in all its phases, is the attempt to so inform
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

public would like to read it." PRossER 812. Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. at

86n.13: "[A] conclusion that the New York Times malice standards apply could
not be reached merely because a statement defamatory of some person ingovemment employ catches the public's interest; that conclusion would virtually disregard society's interest in protecting reputation." See Bertelsman, Libel and
Public Men, 52 A.B.A.J. 657, 662 (1966). Pedrick, Frcedom of the Press and the
Law of Libel, The Modern Revised Translation, 49 Conumn. L.Q. 581, 592-93
(1964). Note, Free Speech and Defamation of Public Persons; The Expanding
Doctrine of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 52 ComamL L.Q. 419,
426n.40
(1967).
' 3SMeildejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. lRv.
245, 263.
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and cultivate the mind and will of a citizen that he shall have
the wisdom, the independence, and, therefore, the dignity
of a governing citizen. Freedom of education is, thus, as
we all recognize, a basic postulate in the planning of a free
society.
2. The achievements of philosophy and the sciences in
creating knowledge and understanding of men and their
world must be made available, without abridgment, to every
citizen.
8. Literature and the arts must be protected by the First
Amendment. They lead the way toward sensitive and informed appreciation and response to the values out of which
the riches of the general welfare are created.
4. Public discussions of public issues, together with the
spreading of information and opinion bearing on those issues,
must have a freedom unabridged by our agents. Though they
govern us, we, in a deeper sense, govern them. Over our
governing, they have no power. Over their governing we have
sovereign power." 39
From the above, it would seem doubtful that Meiklejohn would
have included sports personalities in the public area as the
Court has done, although he would probably have included Mr.
Hill, in view of his connection with the release of a major
play.
If tnte Times doctrine is to be applied to sports, the legitimacy
of the public concern would seem much stronger in the Butts
situation than in Spahn. In Butts, not only was a quasi-public
official involved, but also the alleged rigging of a sporting event
of national interest, which would have constituted a gigantic
fraud on the public itself, whereas in Spahn the fictionalized
biography was concerned primarily with the pitcher's private
life.140
Nevertheless, the majority of the Court would apparently
apply New York Times to Messrs. Hill, Walker, Butts and Spahn
139 Id. at 256.
140

Butts and Spahn seem to put sports and sports figures squarely in the

public sphere and to subject persons prominent in that field-and by analogy those
prominent in entertainment-to all the burdens of New York Times. The writer
as no ouarrel with this where, as in Butts, aspects of sports, such as the integrity
of the results, in which the public has a legitimate interest, are involved. The
same is true of cases like Grayson v. Curtis Pub. Co., 436 P.2d 756 (Wash.
1967), where the ability or sportsmanship of a prominent sports figure are under
discussion. It is only in cases like Spahn, where the private life of the sports
figure is in the spotlight that we express any reservations as to the wisdom of
extending first amendment protections so far.
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without distinction or differentation. Spahn's case, wich can be
considered typical of that of all sporting and entertainment personalities, represents the fringe area of a borderline situation, and
perhaps the Court felt if there was a doubt it was better to resolve
it in favor of the public sphere. 141 Nevertheless, a powerful argument can be made that even a celebrity has a right of privacy with
respect to the non-public aspects of his life.1' But the Court may
have also been influenced by the consideration that sports and
entertainment are more and more engaging the public interest as
developments in electronics make them more readily available to
all.
At any rate, despite the difficulties of borderline applications,
the "public event" approach seems the most flexible and felicitous
rule to follow, for it avoids attempting to apply a sterile, mechanical public official test and looks to all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the events under discussion to determine whether
they are the subject of a legitimate.public concern. The Court has
never directly passed on whether the requirement that the public
concern be legitimate, as distinct from mere public curiosity, is
consistent with the first amendment. It has intimated, however,
that it is.14 3 Indeed, the concern with reputation and privacy
demonstrated by the entire New York Times family of cases seems
to contradict the idea that it must be left to the unreviewable disu
cretion of the press to establish the criteria for "newsworthiness."'
It is true that the legitimate public concern test suggested
here will involve drawing a great many nice distinctions, such as
determining whether the activities of a candidate's law partner
are within the public arena, 45 or whether the public has a
legitimate interest in the doings of an ex-governor, 46 a Russian
141 This

847.

would be in accord with the traditional tort approach. See

PRosSER

142 See Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine-The Celebrity's Right

to Privacy, 80 So. CAL. L. REv. 280, 288 (1957).
143 See note 137, supra.
144 This writer respectfully disagrees with the proposition "that the courts
will not, and indeed cannot, be arbiters of what is newsworthy.... In brief, the
press will be the arbiters of it and the Court will be forced to yield to the
argument that whatever the press prints is by virtue of that fact newsworthy."
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 Sup.
Or.REv. 267, 284.
45
1 See Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S. 2d 823 (1964).
146 See Powell v. Monitor Pub. Co., Inc., 217 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1966).
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czarist prince, 14 7 or the sexual aberrations of a public employee. 14
But the alternative is to abandon to the tender mercies of the press
and political partisans 149 all protection of reputation and character
of those who may be, however indirectly or involuntarily, drawn
into public affairs. And if Mr. Hill can be placed into this category, who of us cannot? In this writer's view whatever effort it
takes to preserve the delicate balance between free speech and
protection of private personality is well worth it.150
V. THE

PRACTICAL AsPECrS: PROVING AcTuAL MALICE

The thesis has been adduced above that, despite the fourjustice plurality opinion of Butts-Walker, the actual malice test
of New York Times should be employed in all future cases concerning factual misstatements arising out of the discussion of
public events. The cases since New York Times was decided in
1964 have illustrated that the burden of proving actual malice is
indeed onerous, but not impossible, to meet.
Actual malice is, of course, more easily alleged than proved,
and many of the reported decisions have simply held that, if it has
been alleged, the plaintiff has a right to try to prove it and cannot

be foreclosed from recovery at the pleading stage.' 51 When it
comes to proof, however, one must remember that the term "actual
malice" is really a misnomer, since its existence has nothing to do
with the presence or absence of ill-will by the speaker.15 2 "Calculated falsehood," which the Supreme Court has used from time
to time to describe the state of mind constituting actual malice, 1 8
is a far more accurate term since it is the actual knowledge of
falsity or a high degree of awareness of probable falsity that is the
key. An intent to inflict harm does not constitute "malice" in the
147 See Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265
N.Y.S.2d 754 (1965).
148 See Note, 75 YALE L.J., supra note 56 at 656 for various examples of
the types of factual analysis likely to be involved.
'49 Indeed, it has been suggested that affording too broad a privilege in this
area would discourage able people from participating in public affairs, because
thev would be deprived of all character protection. See Note, 35 U. Cns. L. REv.
685, 89-90 (1966).
150 Accord, authorities cited in notes 131 and 137 supra.
151 See, e.g., Walker v. Courier Journal and Louisville Times Co. 368
F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1966)- Walker v. Associated Press. 417 P.2d 486 (Colo.
1966); Wells v. Morton, 388 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1965); Gilligan v. King, 48 Misc.
2d 212.
152 264 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1965).
See note 30 supra, and accompaning text.
153 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 75.
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Times sense. Rather, there must exist "an intent to inflict harm
through falsehood."u 54
Quite recently, the Supreme Court had occasion to emphasize
the crucial nature of the falsehood factor once again. In the recent
case of St. Amant v. Thompson, 155 state courts had found that the
defendant, a candidate for public office, had falsely stated that a
union official had passed bribes to the plaintiff, a deputy sheriff,
with complete indifference to the statement's effect on the reputation and career of the plaintiff and without checking beyond the
original source. The state courts had held that this constituted
reckless disregard of the truth, and thus, actual malice under
New York Times. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a
mere lack of conviction by the defendant of the truth of his statements, that is, a more or less neutral state of mind in that regard,
is insufficient to constitute actual malice. Rather, said the Court,
the plaintiff must adduce "sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of his publication."' 56
Although, as the Court acknowledged, this approach might
seem to put "a premium on ignorance"157 in the sense that it
implies that what the attacker of a public official or public
personage doesn't know can't hurt him, it is submitted that such
an approach is necessary if the first amendment values previously
discussed in this article are to be adequately protected under
modern conditions. Further, this latest interpretation of New
York Times malice standards confirms the interpretations given
them by the lower courts during the development of the Times
doctrine. Even under the standards prescribed in St. Amant, the
defamed public official or public figure should still be able to
prove actual malice, if in fact such a state of mind existed. This
is not to say that the burden he must meet is not a heavy one, but
several approaches still remain open to him.
The heart of St. Amant is that there must be evidence that
demonstrates that the defendant knew what he said was false or
was aware of some factor which actually and in fact raised
"serious doubts" in his mind that what he said was true. In other
154Id. at

73.
15536 U.S.L.W. 4338 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1968).
156 Id.at 4334.
157 Id. Cf. Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1968).
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words, the defendant's actual state of mind is the key; it is not
what he should-in the exercise of due care or otherwise-have
believed about the truth of his statements, but what he in fact
did believe about them, that counts.6 8 Therefore, in the unlikely
event that the defendant admits he knew what he said was false,
the burden of proof is met.6 9 However, few cases have been, or are
likely to be that simple. The cases cited in this article show that
few actions involve knowing falsehood. It is the reckless disregard
of the truth half of the actual malice definition that comes into
play most often.
As of this writing, the considerations in determining proof
of actual malice are as follows: It is quite clear that failure to
make an investigation does not in itself constitute sufficient recklessness to satisfy the standard, though it may be relevant if other
factors are present. 1 0 One such factor is the nature of the
publication itself. As the Court points out in St. Amant, Butts
illustrates that if, because of their obvious scurrility' 6' or some
other reason, the publisher's allegations are "so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in
circulation,"'6 2 checking beyond the first source of the story is required.
A look at the facts of some of the Supreme Court decisions
illustrates how the kind of the publication affects the type of
checking necessary. In New York Times itself, where it was not
even apparent that the publication had anything to do with the
plaintiff at all, no checking whatever was required. At the other
extreme, in Butts, where the charges were extremely serious and
the source unreliable, an independent verification was required.
Occupying a middle ground is St. Amant, where the charges,
although serious, were not inherently improbable. Here, the Court
held, the sworn statement of one previously reliable source, with158 Therefore, an assertion of opinion, if based upon a view of the facts
arrived at by methods not constituting actual malic2 under the standards herein
discussed, should always be constitutionally protected. See Oswalt v. State

Record9 Co., 158 S.E.2d 204 (S.C. 1967).
15 Fox v. Kahn, 421 Pa. 563. 221 A.2d 181 (1966).

160 St. Amant v. Thompson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1968). See
Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hans, 36 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1967);
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64

(1964).

161 But. cf. Washington ost Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966),

cert. den. 385 U.S. 1011 (1967).
1236 U.S.L.W. at 4334.
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out further checking was sufficient, but it indicated that making
a similar charge on the basis of a grossly unreliable source, such as
an anonymous phone call, or fabricating such a charge out of whole
cloth would have constituted reckless disregard of the truth.10 3
If checking is required, how far must it go? If the publisher
has actually obtained information, to ignore competent evidence
contrary to the defamatory statements made, while giving undue
weight to questionable evidence supporting such statements, are
indications that the publisher in fact entertains serious doubts as
to the truth of what he is saying and that calumny was the underlying motive for the publication. 16 4 On the other hand, if there

was some reliable source for the erroneous statements made, actual
malice probably does not exist, even though not all possible
sources were checked, or those that were checked had biased
views. 165 As pointed out above, if the matter is not inherently improbable on its face, no checking at all is required. And, if checking is necessary, the effort required bears an inverse ratio to the
"hot news" value of the subject matter of the publication. 6
But, above all, it must be remembered that the burden of
proving actual malice by evidence of "convincing clarity" is on the
plaintiff unassisted by presumptions based on falsity. 167 More must
be shown than that the defendant spoke on the basis of sketchy evidence of the truth of his statements. Plaintiff must prove that the
defendant in fact seriously doubted the truth of what he said. 163
Therefore, more should be required than mere proof that incorrect statements were made by the defendant, that he did not know
the plaintiff, had no personal knowledge of the subject matter of
the statements, opposed the plaintiff politically, 69 or had been
183
164
6

Id.

Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supn. 784 (3.D.N.Y. 1966).

1 5 New ork Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). See also

Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1P'68). A court record or
other public document should always be considered a sufficiently reliable source.
See Ross v. News Journal Co., 228 A.2d 531 (Del. 1967); Grabavoy v. Wilson,
230 N.E.2d 581 (Ill. App. 1967).

166 Associated Press v. Walker and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967).

167New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Beckley
Newspapers
Corp. v. Hanks, 36 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Nov. 7, 1967).
168 St. Amant v. Thompson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1968). Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).

169 But see Ashton, v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 562 (Ky. 1965), rev'd
on other grounds, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).

PNOTECTION OF BEPUTATION AND PRIVACY

engaged in a long standing dispute with him.170
The series of cases culminating with St. Amant have pretty
well filled in the details of actual malice first sketched in outline
by New York Times and Garrison. Guided by the considerations
found in these cases, and by the standards of the publishing industry itself, courts should have no great difficulty in filling in the
remaining details of the portrait on a case by case basis.
VI.

NEW YORK

TIMES TomoRRoW:

BEYOND DEFAMATION

Professor Kalven has suggested that New York Times may be
"a seminal case in that it gave a reading to the first amendment
that can properly guide the Court in cases not involving libel of
public officials."' 71 A significant step in that direction was taken
in Pickering v. Board of Education, 72 in which the Court held
that a teacher could not, under ordinary circumstances not involving a confidential relationship with his superiors, be discharged for untrue statements which were critical of the administration of the school district on matters of public interest, unless
such statements constituted actual malice in the New York Times
sense.
The case is significant as a culmination of a series of cases
developing the rule that teachers and other public employees
may not "be compelled to relinquish the first amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens"' 7 3 as a condition to public
employment. 7 4 But for our purposes it is more significant in that
it seems to extend the Times doctrine to all cases where truth or
falsity of speech concerning matters of public interest is at issue,
not just those involving claims for damages to reputation or
violation for the right of privacy. It would also seem to be a reaffirmation of the proposition that seditious libel is the key to the
75
central meaning of the first amendment.
In the four years between New York Times v. Sullivan and
7

10

Silbowitz v. Lepper, 55 Misc. 2d 443, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1967).

171 Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 SUP. CT.
REv. 267, 305.
172 36 U.S.L.W. 4495 (U.S. June 3, 1968).
'73 Id. at 4496.
174 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker,
7 5 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

1 See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "the Central Meaning

of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. Rnv. 191, 204-05.
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St. Amant v. Thompson and Pickeringv. Board of Education, the
Supreme Court has designed a viable approach to the problem of
resolving the conflict between first amendment freedoms and the
protection of individual interests of reputation and privacy. The
actual malice test of New York Times, as expounded in St. Amant,
is both consistent with first amendment theory and understandable
and workable on a practical level in the nation's trial courtrooms.
The only problem remaining in adding the final touches to the
text of the New York Times doctrine is the treatment to be
afforded public figures. This problem may already have been
solved, since a close analysis of Butts-Walker reveals that a
majority of the justices favor the salutary approach of applying
the actual malice test of New York Times, rather than the gross
negligence test adduced by four of the justices in that case, to
public figures as well as public officials. It is hoped that when the
Supreme Court has occasion to speak again on the status of public
figures, it will unequivocally adopt the actual malice test for
public figures once and for all. If and when this has been done, a
new chapter in the history of the development of our Constitution
will be all but completed, and a subsequent chapter, introduced by
Pickering,will have begun.

